INTRODUCTION
The property tax has long been the primary source. of-tax revenues for local government in the United States. As John Wallis (2001) has documented in his excellent history of the property tax in the USA, the tax has a long and rich history, dating back; to the origins of our nation. In fact, in the 18th and 19th centuries, the tax was used, at various junctures, by all the various levels of government, but, over the course of the 20th century, its use became associated nearly exclusively with local government.
At the same time, local property taxation has long been a contentious issue. The tax has been the source of continuing dissatisfaction from many quarters. During the latter part of the 20th century, for example, a forceful judicial attack called into question the constitutionality of local property taxation as a source of finance for public schools. The basic charge has been .that the tax base is distributed unequally among local jurisdictions, giving rise to unjustifiable fiscal disparities in the funding of public ed1,1cation. This has led several states to restructure their systems of school finance so as to place less reliance on property taxation.
..
The primary candidate as an alternative tax base to that of property for local governments is income.l Indeed, some students of local ,finance have argued that local income taxation would offer a more efficient and equitable source of local tax revenues than does property taxation. It is our purpose in this chapter to review this debate. In addition to the more traditional arguments, some recent analysis of taxation sheds new light on the issue. We find that the new 'double-dividend'literature from environmental taxation has an interesting application here that suggests that the standard excess-burden argument against the 'pyramiding' of local income tax rates on top of state and federal rates may not have much force. But this 8 CilY laxes. cilY spending must be balanced against the older and more traditional administrative argument for the 'separation of sources'.
We begin our study with a brief review of the actual use of property and income taxation by local government in the USA. (In fact, the income tax is little used by local governments; in only a few states does its use reach 'outside some major cities.) We then move on to a conceptual analysis of the workings of the two ta."(esin a setting of local government finance. Here we find that modem fiscal 'analysis offers some provocative..insights into the comparative appeal of the two taxes to set alongside more tradition~con-siderations.
In addition to our conceptual analysis, we have undertaken one new piece of empirical research in which we try to answer the disparitif;S question. The legality of local property taxation for purposes of financing public schools, as we noted, has been called into question because of the disparities in the distribution of the property tax base across local school districts. A natural question that arise~in our study is whether or not a shift away from local property taxation ,to the income tax would resolve this problem. In short, the question here is whether or not the distribution of the tax baSe among school districts under a local income tax is more or less equal than under a property tax. We answer that question, making use Gf , a rich databasefrom four large states in the USA.
Finally, we point out that our study has one important and basic premise: the need for local government to finance a substantial portion of its budget from own revenues. Therese McGuire has recently raised the question: 'Do local governments need a major own-tax source? ' (2001, p.306) . With increased reliance in the USA on state aid for local school finance and in view of the heavy dependence of local government in much of western Europe on intergovernmental transfers, McGuire questions whether it is necessary or important for local government to be fiscally. autonomous: that is, to finance a large part of its own spending.
For the purposes of this chapter, we take the answer to, this question to be yes. Local taxes provide a cru~al fisca1link that encourages jurisdictions to weigh the benefits of proposed programs against their costs. If local expenditures are financed by transfers from above, this link is broken and expenditure decisions become largely a matter of negotiations between local authorities and higher-level agencies that provide the funding. This is not to say that local governments need finance the entirety of their budgets from own revenues. Some fraction of revenues may surely come in the form of intergovernmental grants in order, for example, to alleviate the problem of fiscal disparities. But it is especially important that decisions at the margin be funded locally. When decisions are being made to expand or contract programs, local funding promotes the weighing of benefits against costs. We thus take it as given, for the purposes of this chapter, that local governments require a source of own revenues with which to finance a substantial share of their expenditures..
We are especially pleased to contribute this chapter to a festschrift in honor of Dick Netzer. Netzer's research and writing on issues in local taxation and finance, spanning several decades, have guided and illuminated work in this field. His splendid book, Economics of the Property Tax (1966) , is still a valuable resource for work on property taxation; we have drawn on it in this chapter. We are grateful for the opportunity to salute and celebrate his past and continuing contributions to public finance.
LOCAL TAXATION IN PRACTICE
It will be helpful at the outset simply to examine the structure of local revenue systems in the USA to get some sense of the role that property taxation and income taxes have actually played in local finance. Table 2 .1 provides a historical description of the percentage shares of various sources of revenues for local governments and calls to our attention several noteworthy features of local finance in the USA. First, we find that, over the course of the past cent~ry, iJ;l.tergovernmental grants have come to have . increaSing importance to local government. These transfers accounted for only about 6 per cent of local government revenues in 1902; by 1980, this had risen to almost 40 per cent of local revenues, with substantial increases occurring during the period of judicial attacks on local revenue systems in the 1970s. This trend, however, stopped after 1980, with a decline in the share of grant revenues to about 34 per cent by 1996. Second, we see tP.e primacy of property taxation in systems of local taxes. Property taxes have always accounted for the lion's share of local tax revenues, and they continue to do so. It is true that the share of property tax revenues in total local revenues has fallen significantly over the past century, from about two-thirds of local revenues in 1902 to around onequarter of local revenues in 1996. But property tax receipts continu~to constitute over two-thirds of local tax revenues.
Third, we see in Table 2 .1 that income taxes have never played a large role in US local finances. Nonexistent in 1902, they came into being over the course of the century, but have never accounted for more than 2 per cent of local revenues. These figures mask the wide variation in use across different states. As we see in Table 2 .2. most states make no use of local income taxation. For the country as a whole (including the 50 states and the District of Columbia), they are the source of less than 6 per cent of local tax revenues. Moreover, the significant use of local income taxation is confined to a few states and the District of Columbia.2 In only four states and~e District of Columbia do local income taxes make up more than 15 per cent of local tax revenues. Maryland places the heaviest reliance on this source of revenues, where counties (the major unit of local government in the state) 'piggyback' onto the state income tax. In Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (the largest city in the state) employs a wage tax in which unearned income is excluded and the tax is paid at a flat rate directly by employers in the city on their wage bill; some other cities and school districts in Pennsylvania also use a tax on earned income. In contr~t, the District of Columbia and . New York City make use of more conventional forms of the income tax that tax all forms of income with a progressive rate structure. In Kentucky, two cities, Lexington and Louisville, and county governments tax earned income at'a flat rate while, in Ohio, many municipalities and school districts use a tax on earned income and corporate net profits. School dis~cts in Iowa simply piggyback on the state income tax. Thus, even wit~its limited use in the USA, we find a variety of forms and administration of local income taxation. But the tax is not a major feature of local fiscal structure in the USA.
TAXATION AND EFFICIENT LOCAL FINANCE
There is now an enormous literature, reaching back to the seminal Tiebout (1956) paper nearly 50 years ago, whose evolution has produced a welldefined (if still contentious) view of efficient local public finance. In a ----
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City taxes. city spending Tiebout world, with a large number of local communities offering '3.wide array of outputs of local public services, households choose a community of residence that satisfies their preferences for local services. These services are financed by local taxes that play the role of prices in guiding individual choices so that, as in a private market, the equilibrium outcome is one in which marginal benefits equal marginal costs. What is of central importance for our purposes is the nature of local taxation in this world. Tiebout himself had little to say about this, but the --------Whatshouldlocalgovernmentstax: incomeorproperty? II Hamilton (1975) showed that the introduction of a local zoning rule that specifies a minimwn level of housing consumption effectively converts the local property tax into a head tax of precisely the sort required to generate an efficient Tiebout outcome. In a Tiebout-Hamilton world, households choose a community of residence that offers their preferred levels both of public services and of~ousing. In equilibrium, Tiebout communities are thus homogeneous in both public service and housing consumption. Although the requirem~nts for such a model are, in the limit, very demanding, a number of authors (for example, Fischel, 1992) have argued that this view of local finance is a sufficiently close approximation to reality to have real predictive and normative significance.
More recently, William Fischel (2001) has extended the model to incorporate 'politics'. Fischel's argument is that local communities, operating in the context of a local property tax, function in certain crucial ways like corporations. In short, the Fischel world is one in which local officials (behaving analogously to corporate boards. of directors) choose the mix of spending, taxes and land-use regulations so as to maximize the value of homes in the community. This implies that local fiscal and land-use decisions will employ a benefit-cost criterion: officials will put in place measures (including levels of local outputs or zoning regulations) for which the benefits to the community exceed their costs. This follows since any net benefits (positive or negative) become capitalized into house values.
Capitalization is the centerpiece of this view, since local property values are taken to mirror faithfully the benefits and costs of local policy ch9ices.3 As Fischel puts it, 'local governments are very different from state and national governments, primarily because voters at the municipal level know taxes and services affect their home values. This difference makes the property tax a benefit tax at the local level and a source of deadweight loss at the state or national level ' (2001, p.34) .
The interesting question for our purposes here is how this analysis is affected by the substitution of local income taxation for property taxes. Let us return first to the original Tiebout world, a world of mobile households without any local zoning measures to constrain housing consumption. Oates (1972, pp. 131-40) has examined this -case.As an efficient benchmark, consider a setting in which a large set of local communities finances a broad array of local outputs with a head tax equal to the marginal cost of financ-
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13 ing services for an additional household. Here the head tax plays precisely the same role as a price in a private market. N ow let us introduce a lo~property tax as the instrument to finance local spending in lieu of the head tax. It is straightforward to see that this introduces a distortion that takes the form of underconsumption of housing. The point here is that the price of housing now incorporates the cost of .local services. A household contemplating an expansion in its housing consumption finds that such a choice will mean a higher property tax liability. And this tax component of the price of housing will induce the household to purchase too little housing. This phenomenon, incidentally, is well understood in the literature; it is central to the so-called 'new view' of the property tax (for example, Zodrow, 2001) . Morever, as shown first by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) , this can also result in communities choosing a suboptimal provision of local public services. 4 As a further complication, local property taxation can also distort locational choices and raise issues concerning the existence and stability of equilibria. The point here is that a household's tax-price for local services now depends on the value of the property in the community. Communities with highly' valued property can finance a given budget with a lower tax rate. Thus it is in the interest of a household to locate in a property-rich jurisdiction with low tax rates per unit of services so as to obtain these ser-. vices at a lower tax-price. This can, in principle, generate a game of fiscal 'musical chairs', as people chase one another from low'property value, to high property value, communities. 5
.
But, as we have noted, these distortions can be remedied under a system of local property taxation by the introduction of a zoning ordinance taking the form 1>fHamilton's minimum housing consumption requirement. This converts the local property tax back to a benefit tax and restores both efficiency and stability to equilibria in the local public sector. 6 What about an income tax? Let us assume that, instead of a head tax, local governments finance their spending through the use of a proportional income tax. Here the familiar basic distortion involves the work-leisure choice: the tax discourages work effort by reducing the net return below the 'productive value of labor. But, in a system of local finance, there will be further distorting conseqUences. First, note that a household's tax-price will now depend upon its income; under a proportional income tax, the higher the income, the higher the household's tax bill for any given level of public services and tax rate. This serves to reinforce the basic work-leisure distortion under the income tax, as individuals will now have an enhanced incentive to avoid additional work effort. Second, we get much the same sorts of locational distortions and stability problems as under the property tax. Here households will have an incentive to seek' out jurisdictions ....
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City la.'Ces,city spending composed of high-income residents, where the large .tax base will result in re.1ativelylow tax rates. We can again envision some kind of fiscal musical chairs with lower-income households pursuing high-income residents who, in turn, themselves seek to escape to higher-income jurisdictions.
An interesting question here is whether or not a Hamilton zoning ordinance can restore efficiency and stability under an income tax regime. The answer would appear to be no, since such an ordinance sets a floor on housing consumption, not on income. Irrespective of their housing consumption, households would still have an incentive to seek out high-income communities of residence. But housing consumption is, of ,course, strongly correlated with income. In the limiting case where this positive correla,tion is perfect, the floor on housing consumption would become effectively a minimum income requirement and efficiency would be restored. An equilibrium in the system would be characterized by communities that are homogeneous in housing consumption and income, and this would convert . the local income tax into a pure benefit (or head) tax. But in the more general case where this correlation is less than perfect, we would expect to find some efficiency losses associated with local income taxation. An important issue here is the likely magnitude of these deadweight losses. Timothy Goodspeed (1989) has addressed this issue through the use of a general equilibrium numerical model in which he simulates the impact of local income taxation relative to a benchmark case of a local head tax. As expected, the income tax turns out to be less efficient than the head tax in this exercise, but the magnitude of the loss is modest. Moreover, the move from the head tax to the income tax achieves some income equalization. Goodspeed's sense is that the efficiency case against local income taxation may not be verystrong.
. Let us next return to Fischel's world which supplements Tiebout with politics. Here the argument is that, in the presence of capitalization, local property taxation induces local decision makers, in their quest to maximize local property values, to extend local programs to their efficient levels where , marginal benefits equal marginal cost. The positive net benefits of these .
programs will then manifest themselves in an increase in lo~l property values. But this argument seems basically applicable as well to a system of local income taxation. Other things equal, differentials across local communities in income tax rates will tend to be capitalized into local property values, just as will local differentials in property tax rates. Any program that promises more in the way of benefits than the associated tax liability should produce an increase in local property values under either system of taxation. In consequence, Fischel's politics argument does not appear to favor either system of taxation over the other.
There are two remaining issues that serve to complicate matters even further. First, the Fischel politics argument applies with its clearest force to homeowners. These are the households who see that the value of their homes depends on local fiscal decisions. It is a somewhat different matter for occupants of rental dwellings. The quality of local services and levels of local taxes will tend to manifest themselves in levels of local rents, but this is often only imperfectly perceived and may take place with a substantial time lag. Indeed, there is some evidence that suggests that renters are far more likely to support larger local budgets than are homeowners, a result perhaps of a perception by renters that they do not bear the burden of local property taxes (Oates, 1998) . Roughly t~o-thirds of US households are homeowners, so those communities, largely suburban ones, may behave in the Fischel spirit. But the Fischel case is much less compelling for US center cities where renters constitute a major part of the population. In a city setting, a local income tax may have some real advantages in terms of visibility among residents.?
Second, there is another important difference between income and property taxation. The latter includes commercial and industrial property in the tax base, while the former typically taxes only resident households. And this can have some important efficiency implications. Local government provides public services not only for residents but for local 'business as well. Police, fire, transport, refuse collection and other public services provide important benefits for the local business sector, and in an efficient world firms sbould pay the marginal cost of the services tbat they receive from the local public sector (Oates and Schwab, 1991 ). An income tax on residents completely misses this part of the local public finance nexus. A uniform property tax within a local jurisdiction is unlikely to constitute a perfect benefit tax, but it at least places some tax burden on local commercial-industrial property.
, Our journey through tbe sometimes arcane world of the theory of local finance does not seem, in our view at least, to produce an overwhelming sense that one of our tWosystems of local taxation is to be heavily preferred over the other on pure efficiency grounds. Property taxation seems to get the upper hand in the sense that a pure Hamilton-Tiebout~uilibrium is fully efficient. But such an equilibrium, as we all recognize, can only be, at best, a very rough approximation to reality. Both systems involve the capitalization of fiscal differentials across jurisdictions. Since it encompasses both residential and commercial-industrial sources, local property taxation may get the nod here (at least in a suburban setting), but it is not clear on the basis of the discussion to this point that the efficiency differences between the two systems of local taxation are large. It is time to compare them from some other perspectives.
City 1a.'Ces, city spending THE PYRAMIDING OF TAX RATES,SEPARAT1.0N OF SOURCES AND SOME SECOND-BEST ISSUES In the debate over these two local tax bases, proponents of local property taxation sometimes call upon the so-called doctrine of the 'separation of sources'. The idea here is that the use of the income tax by local government involves a major instance of tax overlapping: the income tax is heavily relied upon by both federal and state levels of government, and its use also by local government means that three different levels of government are taxing the same base. Better, so the argument goes, for local government to have its own tax base, namely property, and leave income taxation to fe<ieral and state governments. A more desirable tax structure from this perspective is one in which different levels of government have their own sources of revenues -or, in short, wherethere is a separation of sources.
I
This argument relies, in part, on the likely increase in excess.burden that results from the pyramiding of tax rates that occurs when several levels of government tax the same base. In our case, the combined marginal ta.,<rates on income of federal and state governments can be quite high. And the exist~g estimates of the excess burden of marginal increases in these rates are large (Browning,1987) . .
In a simple, partial equilibrium framework, it is straightforward to show that the level of excess burden varies positively and exponentially with the tax rate. More specifically, an excise tax on any good or activity, in the;: simplest kind of model, has an excess burden (EB) equal to:
where T is the tax rate, N is consumer expenditure on the good, Ed is the ,price elasticity of demand (absolute value) and Es is the pri~elasticity of supply. Here we find that the excess burden of a tax varies directly with the square of~e ta.,<rate, so that the marginal excess burden rises with the level of the rate. This suggests that local government, rather than piling on yet higher combined rates of income taxation, would do better to tax an activity that is not being ta.,<ed by other levelsof government.
. But this line of argument is not fully compelling for at least two reasons. First, as equation (2.1) indicates, there are other parameters that determine the level of excess burden: in particular, the price elasticities of demand and supply. It is not entirely clear which way this consideration cuts. The supply of work effort overall is thought to be price-inelastic (probably more so than the supply of housing). But it is uncertain whether the price elasticity of demand is greater for labor or for housing consumption. It may be the case that the excess burden from income taxation is somewhat lower than that from property taxes because of the price-elasticities of demand and supply.8
Second, the analysis is partial equilibrium in character. When we put the analysis in the context of a general equilibrium system, especially one with pre-existing distortions from othet: forms of taxation, some new considerations arise. There is an interesting and important new literature that has arisen in the context of environmental taxes that provides some surprising, indeed startling, results. This literature has involved a reconsideration of the use of Pigouvian taxes to internalize the external costs of polluting activities.9 In the absence of other distorting taxes, such Pigouvian taxes., equal to marginal social damage, can correct the existing distortion in polluting activities and restore a state of Pareto efficiency. However, in a second-best setting with other distorting taxes, most notably a tax on labor income, the analysis changes character. The tax on pollution, by raising the cost and price of pollution-intensive goods, now exacerbates the existing distortion in the work-leisure choice associated with the income tax by reducing the real wage (and hence the return to work effort). What is astonishing about these studies is how large in magnitude this indirect, and apparently second-order, effect can be. Numerical analyses, making use of computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, find that, in some circumstances, the second-best optimal tax on pollution is well below the level of marginal social damages. Moreover, if the revenues from the"tax are not used to reduce the rates of other distorting taxes.,the first-best Pigouvian levy can, under certain circumstances, even reduce total welfare. The general presumption arising from this (and earlier studies of efficiency in taxation) is that a broader tax base is likely to be preferred to a more narrow one in order to limit the potential for distorting substitution.
This line of analysis has obvious relevance to our problem, for it suggests that we should consider local property taxation in the context of a system with an existing (and large) income tax. In this setting, the property tax raises the price of housing consumption, a major item in household budgets., which reduces the return to work effort and thereby increases the welfare loss from the distortion in the work-leisure choice. More generally, there is a presumption in favor of income over property taxation because it represents a, more inclusive tax base. Although we have not tried to construct a CGE model to obtain actual estimates of the magnitude of this effect, we suggest that such an exercise might prove useful. At any rate, this body of workcertainly raises some reservations concerning the simple pyramiding-of-rates argument in favor of local property taxation.
-------
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INCIDENCE, TAX ADMINISTRATION AND SOME OTHER MATTERS
A central issue in the design of a tax system is the fairness or equity of the system. Invoking the ability-to-pay criterion on equity grounds, proponents of local income ta.'{ation frequently cite the progressive character of income taxes in their case against the local property tax. The income tax is a progressive tax; the property tax, in contrast, is a regressive tax, since housing expenditure makes up a smaller fraction of the income of higherincome households. Income, so the argument goes, is thus a superior measure of ability-to-pay than is the value of one's house. On further examination, however, this argument is not so straightforward as it appears. First, local income taxes are typically nQt very progressive; often they are simply flat-rate taxes (such as the Philadelphia wage tax), although they may still possess some progressivity from an exempted level of income.lo Second, the property tax may be much less regressive than it appears. Housing consumption is highly correlated with income, so that a proportional tax on property values may not differ greatly in its progression from a proportional income tax. Indeed, it has been argued that housing consumption provides a better measure of 'permanent income' than does current income. At an¥ rate, it seems clear tha,t the alleged regressivity of property taxation is much less when it is measured against permanent, rather than"current, income (Netzer, 1966,p.42) .
. Yet more basic, under the so-called 'new view' of the property tax (first propounded by Peter Mieszkowski, 1972) , the average rate of property taxation across all localities is seen as a general tax on capital. From this perspective, the tax becomes quite progressive, since ownership of the nation's stock of capital is strongly skewed in favor of high-income households. Thus, according to the 'new view' (which is not so 'new' now), the property tax is a progressive, not a regressive, tax.
But even this dispute can be seen in a wholly different light if we return to a Tiebout-Hamilton wo"rldof local finance. In such a setting, incidence is less relevant, for one's property tax bill directly represents the price of local services. There is no redistribution of income in the local public sector: people simply get what they pay for, just as in a private market. Redistribution is not an issue here.
The incidence issue (like the efficiency issue) is thus a complicated one for our comparison of local income and property taxation. There is, however, a related strand of argument that has some force both in principle and in practice: the life cycle and cyclical patterns of tax liability under the two forms of taxation. A case can be made for income taxation on the grounds that it provides a better match over time of tax payments with current income. Older and retired individuals, for example, sometimes find that, with their reduced retirement incomes, they are hard-pressed to meet their continuing property tax liabilities, especially if these liabilities are rising as a result of reassessments and/or increasing local budgets. Likewise, individuals who experience a temporary shortfall of income may have difficulty in paying their property tax bills. In contrast, one's tax liability under an income tax adjusts automatically, for the current tax payment varies directly with the household's level of current income. Recognizing this problem, many states have introduced 'circuit-breaker' rules that limit property tax payments as a fraction of current income. But this rather ad hoc kind of measure seems less satisfactory than simply tying current tax bills to current income.
But even this advantage of income taxes has its downside. One appealing feature of the local property tax is the stability of the revenues that it provides for local government. Property tax receipts, since they depend on assessed values that are revised only periodically, are not very responsive to cyclical changes in income. If the economy slides into recession and incomes fall, the local public sector is largely shielded from the recessionary pressures through stable property tax liabilities. Under an income tax, of course, local revenues fluctuate with the state of the economy. Thus what is good for.taxpayers in terms of matching tax bills with income is not good for them in terms of maintaining a stable flow of revenues for their local governments.
Finally, the issue of tax administration and cost would seem to favor local income taxation. This is a case where tax overlapping among levels of government provides a real benefit. Since most state governments have income taxes, it can be a straightforward matter for localities simply to piggyback on the state tax' and thereby rely on the existing state agency to handle the administration and collection of the tax. All the local government need do is choose the local tax rate; the state government can then collect the tax as a simple 'add-on' to the state income tax liability and refund the applicable portion to the-local government. Property taxation, in contrast, involves a whole separate administrative apparatus that requires the definition and 'discovery' of the tax base and the assessment of property values. Substantial progress and improvements have been made through the years in the administration of the tax, especially in assessment procedures, but it continues to be a source of taxpayer discontent, with a host of associated legal issues (Youngman, 1994) .
City taxes, city spending
PROPERTYTAXATION AND SCHOOL FINANCE: THE DISPARITIES ISSUE
The property tax has long been a cornerstone of the US system of school finance. Local goverilments provide roughly one-half of the resources devoted to public education.in the USA, and they raise nearly two-thirds of those funds through the property tax. The property tax is virtually the only source of,tax revenue for independent school districts (that is, school districts that are not part of a municipality or county government).
This reliance on the property tax lies at the heart of a long string of court cases that have challenged the constitutionality of local funding of public schools. Critics have argued that the property tax is inherently unfair, because large disparities in tax bases across school districts lead inevitably to large differences' in spending. In the landmark 1971 case, Serrano v. Priest, the California State Supreme Court declared the state's system of public school finance unconstitutional. In this case, the plaintiffs' attorneys showed that Beverly Hills spent more than twice as much per student as Baldwin Park, a low-income community 25 miles east of Los Angeles. Because of Beverly Hills' larger tax base, however, its school property tax rate was less than half of Baldwin Park's (Fischel, 1996) . The court ordered the state to develop a system where school support did not depend on district wealth; the new system must satisfy the principle of 'fiscal neutrality'.
Litigation in other states soon followed. California is one of 43 states where opponents of local funding for primary and secondary schools have challenged the constitutionality of the system of public school finance. The courts have overturned systems in. 20 states and upheld systems in 20 others; cases are still pending in the remaining three. In addition, litigation has been filed in a number of states where the state supreme court had already ruled. In New Jersey, for example, there have now been six major separate supreme court decisions in school finance cases since 1973.
State governments have offered a wide range of respo.nses both to these legal challenges and to broad concerns over inequities in public school spending associated with inequality in property tax wealth. State legislatures have, for example, implemented or revised equalization formulas and increased their state's share of educational spending. In this section of the chapter, we look at a different strategy. Suppose school districts switched from a property tax to a local income tax. Would differences in tax bases across school districts rise, fall or remain roughly constant as a result?
The ideal data set for this analysis would include detailed information on the property tax base and income for each of the 15000 school districts in the USA. tricts. Unfortunately, no single source provides similar data on property wealth. As a consequence, it is very difficult to look at all districts in all states. Instead, we have chosen four large states where district-level data on property' wealth are available from-the state governments: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Texas. (The supreme courts in three of these states, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Texas, have overturned their state's system of school finance; a New York case is still going on.) We then combined the 1990 Census data on income and the data from the states on property wealth in order to compare the inequality in the distribution of the bases for a property tax and a local income tax. We suspect that there are significant differences across the four states in the definition of property wealth. We therefore limit our analysis to within state differences in wealth and income and do not look at any differences across states. We provide a description of the data in our appendix.
'
Our goal is to compare the distribution of income per student and property wealth per student across school districts. District enrollments are highly skewed. Nationally, roughly one-third of all public school students are enrolled in about 2 per cent of all school districts. A similar pattern emerges in the four states we study here. For example, New York state had 687 school districts and'more than 2.6 million public school students in 1992. Over 37 per cent of those students lived in New York City; 34 districts had fewer than 270 students. We therefore weight our district data by enrollment in order to account for differences in size.
We have developed two measures of the inequality in the base for a property tax and a local income tax across districts, the Theil index and the ratio of the tax base at the 95th percentile to the tax base at the fifth percentile. For tax base i (where i is either income or property wealth) and state k, the Theil index Tlk equals . (2.2) where Xljkis the tax.base per pupil in districtj, Jk is the num~r of districts in statek, Pjkis the fall enrollmentindistrictj in state k, and Xikis thepupil-, weighted mean tax base per pupil for the state. A value of zero on the Theil index indicates perfect equality in the tax base among districts. The index reaches the natural log of state enrollment when one district has the entire tax base and the rest have nothing. The effect of a transfer among districts on the Theil index depends on the ratio of tax bases for the districts. A $100 transfer between districts with relatively equal resources will lead to a -
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City taxes, cicyspending smaller drop in the Theil index than will a $100 transfer between districts with very unequal resources.
The construction of our second measure is straightforward. For each tax base. we rank districts within each state in terms of tax base per pupil. We then calculate the ratio of the tax base at the 95th percentile of this distribution to the tax base at the fifth percentile of this distribution. By construction. this second measure is insensitive to extremely large or small values. Unlike the Theil index, this measure equals one if the tax base per student is the same across all districts: that is, if we have perfect equality. Table 2 .3 presents two sets of measures for tax base inequality per pupil. The message from the table seems quite clear: property wealth is distributed much more unequally across districts than is income. Consider first the 95/ 5 ratios shown in rows one and two of Table 2. 3. There are significant differences in income across districts in all four states. Income per pupil in the richest districts in Texas, for example, is nearly five times as large as income per pupil in the poorest districts. In all four states, this ratio of income per pupil in the richest to the poorest districts is over three. But differences in property wealth per pupil are even larger than these differences in income. In New York, New Jersey and Texas, the property tax base per pupil in the wealthiest districts is roughly seven times as large as that in the poorest districts. In all four states, inequality in property wealth (as measured by our 95/5 ratio) is at least 50 per cent higher than inequality in income; in New York it is more than twice as high.
The Theil indices in the lower panel of Table 2 .3 tell a similar story. Inequality in property wealth per pupil is roughly three times as high as inequality in income per pupil in New York, twice as high in New Jersey and Texas, and 1.7 times as high in Massachusetts.
We must admit that we found ourselves somewhat surprised by these results. We had no strong priors on the likely outcome, but, if anything, we probably expected roughly similar degrees of inequality Under both tax bases. In fact, we would not have been too surprised to find less inequality in property wealth per pupil than in income per pupil. There are some quite poor residential areas in terms of income that are embedded in a heavily industrialized setting, and one might expect that such districts, although poor in income, would be relatively well off under property taxation because of a large nonresidential tax base. To investigate this issue in more depth, we examined the cases of some urban school districts. We report these findings in Table 2 .4. For our first case in row one, we see that the ratio of property wealth per pupil in the New Bedford School District to property wealth per pupil in the state of Massachusetts is 0.398; for income, this" ratio is 0.538. In fact, for every case in Table 2 .4, property wealth per pupil is less relative to the state average than is income per pupil. The Camden District in New Jersey is a particularly striking case. Here we find that income per pupil is less than one-quarter of income per pupil in New Jersey. But the situation is far worse under property taxation: Camden's property tax base per pupil is only 11 per cent of the state average. We note that the districts that we chose to include in Table 2 .4 are not outliers. If we were to ", Our findings thus indicate with little ambiguity that tax-base disparities across school districts would be significantly less under local income taxation than under property taxation. But we should not exaggerate the importance of this. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that, even with local income taxation, there would remain large differences in the tax base per pupil across school districts. Local income taxation most certainly will not cure the disparities problem; it will alleviate it somewhat. But it seems to us unlikely that a.shift in tax base from property to income would in itself provide an acceptable response to the courts' objections to existing systems of school finance.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our odyssey through the vast literature and wide-ranging issues associated with local income and property taxation has not, in our view, led us to a clear-cut conclusion concerning the superiority of one tax base over the other. While local income taxation may get the nod on grounds of administrative simplicity and cost, the relative merits of the two taxes are far less clear in terms of economic efficiency, equity and the critical role that local taxes play in facilitating local fiscal decision making. In fact, it is our sense that both of these taxes provide workable and reasonably efficient sources of local revenues. Local finance can probably function effectively, in the USA at least, making use of either tax.
Our major empirical finding in this chapter is the sizeable reduction in tax-base disparities that would occur under a move to local income taxation. However, as we noted, significant differences in tax base per pupil across school districts would remain. There would still be a need for equalizing transfers from the state government, although they would presumably be somewhat smaller in magnitude.
In our summing up, we want to return briefly to the issue of local fiscal choice and the tax base. There is another aspect of the separation of sources concept that has, we believe, some relevance here. In opting for local income taxation, local government in the USA becomes involved in a major instance of tax overlapping, as the income tax is a primary source of revenues at both the federal and the state levels. On the one hand, this has some advantages; as we have noted, this can serve to simplify administration and reduce collection costs for local governments. But, on the other hand, it brings with it a more subtle problem. There is a visibility issue here. With -----------local income taxation, one's tax payment is typically lumped together with taxes paid to other levels of government in a way that serves to obscure the distinctly local component of the tax bill. And this may well weaken the link.between local spending and taxes.
Under local property taxation, we have a real separation of sources. Local government has its own tax base, distinct from state and federal levels, and households and local businesses know that their local tax bills are going to nnance local services. This should enhance local control and accountability. This is quite different from a system of local income taxation, where the local tax payment is bundled together with a state tax liabil-.' it.y.This particular attraction of local property taxation is difficult to formalize in an economic model, or to quantify, but it is our sense that it is . potentiallysignificantand might wellswingthe balance in the choiceof a systemof local taxation.12 .
In addition, there is the basic maxim of taxation that 'An old~ax is a good tax'. The local property tax has been around for a long time in the USA, and any radical change to replace it with local income taxation would set in motion (among other things) a widespread and major set of windfall gains and losses. But this is admittedly a transitory matter that should not weigh too heavily in our deliberations.
Finally, we want simply to note that there is a further variation on property taxation that we have not addressed in this chapter. The tax need not apply the same rate both to the value orland and to the value of the structures on the land. Some cities in Pennsylvania, for example, employ a twotier system of property taxes under which the rate on structures is less than that on land. In the limit, of course, the tax rate on structures can be zero, thereby converting the tax into a pure tax on land value. Land-value taxation, as has long been recognized, has some very appealing properties. For one, it eliminates any distortions associated with the taxation of capital. Although this issue goes beyond the scope of our chapter, it is an appropriate matter to raise in closing, for it has been of longstanding interest to Dick Netzer (for example, 1998). NOTES services.
. 8. As Ian Parry commented to us, there I!1ILy be an efficiencyargument for the property tax in light of the large subsidy to housing in the form of the deduction of mortgage interest from taxable income. The property tax, by raising the price of housing, serves to counteract the pre-existing federal tax sUbsidy. 9. See Parry and Oates (2000) for a review and assessment of this literature. 10. Parry has suggested to us that state-local income taxes may actually be regressive when we take account of certain' exemptions (for example, non-wage compensation such as employer-paid medical insurance) and deductions (such as pensions contributions and mortgage interest). If. the ratio of exemptions plus deductions to taxable income increases with income,"then a proportional income tax would be regressive (aside from the basic exemption). 11. There are some interesting exceptions to this rule. Atlantic City, New Jersey, has a number of very large casinos. Property wealth per pupil in Atlantic City is more than three times the New Jersey average; income per pupil in Atlantic City is just 70 per cent of the New Jersey average. 12. The authors' home state of Maryland is, interestingly, one of the few in which local governments, counties in this instance, place a significant reliance on local income taxation. Thl ocal component of the tax is simply a percentage 'add-on' to the state tax liability with an upper rate limit. Most Maryland counties are at this limit, which essentially converts the tax into a lump-sum SOUICC of local revenues. Fiscal decisions at the margin involve rates on the property tax (although there are some county limitations here too). 
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Income and Enrollment Data
Total income in each district was calculated using district-Ie~l per capita income in 1989 and total district population .estimates from the School District Database (SDDB). District public school enrollment estimates were also tak.en from the 1990 SDDB.
